Hate, Politics, Law: Critical Perspectives on Combating Hate (2018). Thomas Brudholm & Birgitte Schepelern Johansen, eds. Oxford University Press by Menshikov, A. S.
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2019
Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 68–70
http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/csp.2019.3.1.061
Received 10 March 2019 © 2019 Andrey S. Menshikov
Published online 1 April 2019 asmenshikov@urfu.ru
BOOK REVIEW
Hate, Politics, Law: Critical Perspectives 
on Combating Hate (2018). Thomas Brudholm  
& Birgitte Schepelern Johansen, eds.  
Oxford University Press1
Andrey S. Menshikov
Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russia
This volume comprises the essays, which provide critical perspectives on hate. 
The habitual usage in public discourse places hate in the context of all that 
opposes the good and links it to violence. The assumption is that violence is 
caused by hate and, therefore, if we wish to prevent violence it is our duty to 
counter hate. In turn, this idea justified the extension of state power by limiting 
freedom of speech and by letting the state to punish not only for criminal actions 
but also for views and attitudes behind those actions.
Thus, the authors claim, combating hate has itself become an ambivalent 
endeavor. This seemingly provocative thesis is, however, thoroughly 
substantiated by a wealth of historical and conceptual research on how hate 
was integrated into modern public discourse and legal system. The more 
attenuated picture emerges from the very beginning when the stages and 
national variation are described.
Hate’s first appearance in law is traced to the International Convention on 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), which decries “racial 
superiority or hatred”, and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966), which calls to penalize “any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”. The 
international concern with racism across the globe in this period of decolonization, 
on the one hand, and apartheid, on the other, exerted significant pressure on 
national legal systems to condemn racial discrimination. In Europe, UK, Germany, 
and France introduced penalties for “hate speech”, “although each of these three 
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countries responded to international pressures” to act against anti-Semitism and 
racism, “domestic differences” also affected the timing and precise wording of their 
laws” (p. 20). 
These differences in national contexts stemmed from respective agendas: 
the growing numbers of immigrants in the UK and the recurrence of anti-Semitism 
in Germany and France. In the US, in the aftermath of the civil rights movement, it 
was hate crimes that draw the attention of the public and legislature rather than hate 
speech. Unlike Europe, the drive towards making “bias-motivation” an aggravating 
circumstance in the crime was mostly spearheaded by social activists in the US. As 
the editors put it hate discourse in the US was “the result of a political strategy by 
activists as a means to encourage media coverage and public sympathy” (pp. 3–4). 
Thus, although hate was an umbrella term for a number of different concerns and 
policies on it varied, hate has become an “organizing principle for understanding” 
certain kind of evil.
This notion flourishes in public use and was expanded to refer to new groups, 
which could be the object of hate (religion, gender identity, disability, etc.); new forms 
of expressing hate (genocide or Holocaust denial, etc.) and new venues to do so 
(Internet). Nevertheless, “hate is more a public construction than a formal legal term” 
(p. 33). Subsequent chapters discuss alternative ways of looking at what hate might 
mean in diverse cultural contexts such as ancient Greece and Rome; how it can be 
conceptualized on the basis of psychological knowledge; and in which ways art can 
contribute to mitigating hate through self-scrutiny.
Nevertheless, I would focus on further analysis of legal and political 
implications of the critical approach to hate. One important point the authors 
make is that in talking about hatred we might better use other terms such as group 
defamation and bias crime. Emotional and irrational connotations contained in the 
concept of hate tend to disguise what is at stake in fighting against hatred and hostility 
motivated by biased attitudes. With the development of history and sociology of 
emotions, we learn ever more about the interplay between innermost feelings and 
social arrangements. Thus, instead of suppressing or punishing individual emotional 
dispositions we should highlight their basis in “structures of prejudice, illegitimate 
power hierarchies, and discrimination”. If the public agenda will continue to revolve 
around hate and measures against it rather than “structural embedding” of hate 
speech and hate crimes, we are probably fighting a losing battle.
Another reason to be suspicious about reducing discriminatory attitudes and 
bias-motivated violence to “hate” is, in my view, that punishing hate tips the shaky 
balance between material crime and “thoughtcrime” more towards the latter. It is 
clear that notions that refer to the mental state of individuals such as criminal intent 
or heat of passion exist in law. It is also obvious that hate attitude is surmised on the 
basis of observable expressions or actions, that is, on the basis of demonstrable 
evidence. Furthermore, it is not hate per se, not the emotion that is punished, but its 
presence in the deed, its enactment, which constitutes an aggravating offence. Yet, 
if an individual has the right to love s/he has equal right to hate. As Max Scheler once 
explained it, hate is just the other side of love: if you love something you necessarily 
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hate its opposite. Unconditional absolute love is a divine attribute and not human. 
M. Thorup specifically discusses “democratic hatreds” in his chapter, and shows 
that even democracies create their own “hateful enemies”. By presenting democracy 
as our salvation from violence we are thus obliged to oppose all forms of violence 
and, simply put, to “hate the haters”.
Finally, if hate is irrational it can’t be eradicated by repressive measures. If 
it is rational and relies on certain moral choice, punishment again is hardly the 
most effective way to deal with. Perhaps, a broader view that ascribes some 
positive value to hate, as in N. Yanay’s chapter, who argues that “love and hate 
are not simply opposites but also nested in each other” (p. 6), or the other means 
of dealing with hate crimes such as restorative rather than punitive measures, as 
proposed by M. A. Walters, could help us approach the dangers of hate in society 
more reasonably.
